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Summary 
The present report addresses the issue of security sector reform in the small West African 
state of Guinea-Bissau. Since gaining independence in the 1970s, Guinea-Bissau has been 
characterized by political instability, coups d’etat, overthrow attempts and the 
interference of military factions within politics. 
Following a brief civil war in 1998-99, the International Community placed the blame 
for political instability, lawlessness and lacking social and economic development on the 
Bissau-Guinean security sector. Furthermore, the country turned into an international 
problem case at the start of the new century due to its role as both a hub for drug trafficking 
and a transit and sending country for irregular migrants destined for Europe. International 
donor nations have held the hope that security sector reforms would contribute to 
stabilizing the country nationally and sub-regionally along with fostering the rule of law and 
peaceful socio-economic development. 
Numerous attempts at implementing security sector reform since 2005 have either 
failed or not achieved their desired results. Some measures have even had the effect of 
aggravating the troubled political situation in the country further. A coup carried out in 
April 2012 ultimately led to the suspension of a large portion of on-going projects run by 
the International Community – only to be lifted after a new, democratically legitimized 
government was sworn in July 2014. 
In the following, I argue that the concept of security sector reform in its present 
application is untenable. Disparate perceptions exist on the donor and recipient side 
concerning reforms and the expectations arising from them while local interests and 
concerns have thus far only partially been understood and taken into consideration. The 
possibilities for participation by the local government, members of the security sector, 
civil society and the general populace remain limited. Local perspectives have tended to 
only gain consideration selectively rather than continually, resulting in the absence of an 
essential precondition for successful reforms. The primary factors attributed to failure so 
far include: 1.) vastly differing understandings and expectations on the donor and on the 
Bissau-Guinean side, 2.) lacking coordination, integration, flexibility and continuity 
among the various reform strategies, 3.) structural procedural constraints on the donor 
side that yield rigid and short-term project approaches, 4.) inadequate financial resources, 
5.) insufficient incorporation of societal actors and representatives from the Bissau-
Guinean security sector within the reform process, and 6.) poor communication. One 
tangible expression of this failure has been the discrepancy that exists between the 
demands and the practical implementation of the reforms. 
Alternative approaches must begin with broad public dialog and better incorporate 
varying local perspectives in order to create flexible strategies for the reform process. 
Additionally, the involved staff from within the security sector must be made aware of 
tangible benefits. In order to rid the concerned parties of any anxiety in regards to 
unknown processes and change, the sources of fear and resistance among politics and the 
security forces should be openly spoken about while plans should be elucidated and 
pursued in a gradual manner. 
 II 
There are, however, several obstacles standing in the way of improving the execution 
of security sector reforms that cannot immediately be surmounted. One serious factor is 
the fact that previous reform attempts have contributed to exasperating and destabilizing 
the political situation in Guinea-Bissau. Former measures and failures have further 
intensified mistrust and critical attitudes towards any reform attempts among certain 
segments of politics, the police and the military. Though opposition can never completely 
be overcome, clear majority support has to exist for the sake of reform. Procedural 
constraints on the donor side are also a contributing factor, meaning that it is unlikely for 
rapid transformations in the approaches to security sector reform to be expected within 
large organizations such as the UN and the EU. Groundwork carried out behind the 
scenes characterized by long-term orientations could provide promise for improving the 
prospects for success, possibly in combination with conventional strategies for security 
sector reform.  
. 
  
Contents 
 
 
1.   Introduction 1 
 
2.  Guinea-Bissau’s Security Sector: an Overview 4 
 
3.  Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau 5 
3.1  The context 5 
3.2  Too many cooks ... 6 
3.3  ... spoil the broth: an analysis 11 
 
4.  The Problem of Local Ownership 12 
4.1  The cleft between demands and practice 12 
4.2  A lack of embedding of projects and international experts 17 
4.3  One-way “transfer” of ideas and concepts 19 
 
5.  Prospects 23 
 
References 26 
Table of Abbreviations 31 
 
 
 

  
1.  Introduction 
Security sector reforms are commonly considered to be a precondition for establishing 
effective and democratic legal, police and military structures, facilitating political stability, 
and ensuring economic and social development in post-conflict states.1 Reforms in the 
security sector entail a political and highly ambitious – on account of their holistic character 
– concept that, in reality, often lags far behind expectations. This has likewise been the case 
in Guinea-Bissau, a country which has, for decades, not only been characterized by 
economic deficiencies and social imbalances but also political instability – both of which 
stand in connection with problems in the security sector. Reforming the security sector has 
therefore seemed to offer an escape from the persistent national crisis. However, hitherto 
reforms have failed to fulfill the awaited expectations – on the contrary. Within expert 
circles, Guinea-Bissau is considered to be a prime example for the failure of security sector 
reforms. As such, this small West African nation provides a suitable case for investigating 
the causes of these failures by analyzing the discrepancies existent between officially 
proclaimed demands for holistic security sector reforms on the one hand, and the manifold 
difficulties and challenges present in their practical implementation on the other.  
The problems facing Guinea Bissau are, indeed, immense. The country has primarily 
garnered attention over the last years through negative headlines. The main reasons for 
this have included repeated interventions by the military into politics, numerous coups 
(most recently in April 2012), and the country’s transformation into an international hub 
for drug trafficking. These developments have imbued this small African nation with the 
designation of “failed” (Failed State Index 2013). Despite what one may think of such 
classifications (for critiques, see Bethge 2012; Luckham/Kirk 2013: 13, 15), Guinea-
Bissau’s poor results in the current Human Development Index (Malik 2014) do, in fact, 
allude to the existence of fundamental problems. 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:LocationGuineaBissau.svg (4.12.2014). 
 
 
1  I would like to extend my thanks to Claudia Baumgart-Ochse, Peter Kreuzer, Sabine Mannitz, Eva 
Ottendörfer and the participants of the PRIF academic colloquium for their feedback and support in 
regards to this text. 
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Ever since the civil war in 1998-99, the International Community has placed the blame for 
political instability, lawlessness and lacking social and economic development on the 
Bissau-Guinean security sector. There were hopes that reforming the security sector would 
stabilize the country and facilitate its peaceful development. Proponents of this concept held 
on to the conviction that a security sector reform would ensure the establishment of a 
capable constitutional state as well as effective security forces that are accountable to the 
government. Creating democratic structures in the security sector would create a positive 
climate for investment, allowing private investment to rise and corruption to decrease, 
which would, in turn, create jobs, economic growth and social development. Such reforms 
would also supposedly satisfy the interest of donors by reducing drug trafficking, politically 
stabilizing the region and limiting illegal migrations via Guinea-Bissau to Europe (see 
OECD 2007). In order to achieve this, various international and supranational actors 
attempted to implement a reform of the security sector starting in 2005. Though these 
actors worked together with Bissau-Guinean representatives from the government as well as 
the security sector, they have been met with limited success up to now. Blame for these 
failures has primarily been placed on opposition to reform attempts within the military and 
politics, insufficient capacities held by Bissau-Guinean authorities, and lacking coordination 
among the various donors. The fact that this mission has been unsuccessful has not only 
resulted in frustration and disappointment among those who had attempted to implement 
the related projects, but has likewise reinforced Guinea-Bissau’s overall negative image. 
Considering this background, questions arise as to the causes of these failures in past reform 
attempts. In the following, I argue that the concept of security sector reform in its present 
application is untenable. Disparate perceptions exist on the donor and recipient side 
concerning reforms and expectations arising from them, compounded by the fact that local 
interests and concerns are also only understood and considered in part. Opportunities for 
participation by the local government, members of the security sector, civil society and the 
general populace continue to remain limited. Furthermore, local perspectives have tended 
to only gain selective rather than continual consideration, making one of the essential 
preconditions for successful reforms absent. The primary factors attributed to failure thus 
far include: 1.) vastly differing understandings and expectations on the side of the donors 
and the Bissau-Guineans, 2.) lacking coordination, integration, flexibility and continuity 
among the various reform strategies, 3.) structural procedural constraints on the donor side 
that promote rigid and short-term project approaches, 4.) insufficient financial resources, 
5.) lacking incorporation of societal actors and representatives from the Bissau-Guinean 
security sector within the reform process, and 6.) poor communication. 
One manifestation of the broadly diagnosed failure has been the discrepancy between 
the demands and the practical implementation of the reforms. The contrast existent 
between official success reports and documents made to be attractive, euphemistic and filled 
with empty phrases, on the one hand, and the impressions held by civil society and 
representatives from the government and security sector, on the other, is often stark. As I 
set out to demonstrate in the following, demands for considering local requests, long-term 
and holistic approaches, and improved coordination of reform efforts are, to a degree, 
regularly reinforced (see United Nations General Assembly-Security Council 2013; United 
Nations Security Council 2014) and international actors are committed to the norm of local 
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ownership in Guinea-Bissau as well. Upon closer inspection, however, significant 
differences surface between the demands and the actual practice of security sector reform. 
Such assurances often represent nothing more than lip service. As I will demonstrate, this 
discrepancy is partially the result of biographical differences among many international 
experts, often tending to be technical professionals rather than development experts. They 
are frequently prisoners of the given structures such as short project durations, long 
application terms, limited financial means, changing contact persons and responsibilities, 
etc. Despite these existing conditions, rapid and measurable success is still required of them. 
Insufficient knowledge about the country and language skills act as additional obstacles to 
these experts’ abilities to conceptualize complex local problems and conflict situations as 
well as local perceptions and interpretations. Additionally, the relevant actors among the 
Bissau-Guinean authorities are either allegedly or indeed not sufficiently trained in 
comprehending, planning or implementing complex reform efforts. Other factors that 
hinder the process of reform include: unreasonable expectations from donors, a fixation on 
external sources of financing and, last but not least, “grey eminences” within the 
government, security forces and public administration that feel threatened by the reforms. 
In the following two chapters, I will start by presenting a brief historical overview of the 
security sector in Guinea-Bissau that spans the period from independence up to the end of 
the civil war in 1999. Connected to this, the third chapter gives an overview of the previous 
and current reform efforts within the security sector in Guinea-Bissau. With this, I intend to 
uncover the lines of development as well as their resultant problems and hitherto strategies 
for resolution in the sectors of the police, military and judiciary. To begin with, I first 
address the existing conditions for security sector reforms followed by a summary of the 
primary actors and their projects and reform strategies up to the present. This includes a 
critical analysis of the concept of security sector reform as well as its application. Finally, I 
present the political and structural causes that have led to the failure of central reform 
efforts in the fourth chapter. Here, I take a more detailed look into the shortcomings of the 
attempted reforms by investigating the discrepancies existent between official expectations 
and the practical implementation of the concept of local ownership, an idea that assumes a 
central position in discourse involving security sector reforms. This is done by contrasting 
various perspectives about the reform efforts, such as those held by international experts, 
members of the security sector and civil society actors. 
This report draws on primary and secondary sources, on grey literature, and, most 
importantly, on findings from an eight-week field research stay in Guinea-Bissau in 
February and March 2013. Ethnographic data presented here is based on interviews, 
unofficial talks and observations that have been made anonymous to protect the dialog 
partner. 
4 Christoph Kohl 
 
 
2. Guinea-Bissau’s Security Sector: an Overview 
Guinea Bissau gained its independence from Portugal after a bloody war for liberation 
from 1973 to 1974 (see Rudebeck 1974; Dhada 1993). The independence struggle was 
dominated by the left-wing oriented African Party for the Independence of Guinea 
[Bissau] and Cape Verde (Portuguese acronym: PAIGC), which, starting in 1974, 
enforced an authoritarian one-party state until the introduction of a multi-party system in 
the 1990s. The country’s armed forced trace their roots back to the People’s Revolutionary 
Armed Forces that were assembled as a rebel army in 1964. The combatants often only 
received brief military training and had, in many cases, not completed any formal 
schooling. Following the war, many of them were offered positions outside of the military 
within the civil service, primarily on the police force.  
Members of the ethnic group Balanta, one of the largest in the country, have been 
overrepresented within the military since its founding. This can be traced back to 
geographic causes, as the war was concentrated in areas that are primarily populated by the 
Balanta. In accordance with their own self-perception, the Balanta are also considered to be 
socially and economically disadvantaged as the majority of them live in remote areas, a fact 
that may have facilitated their participation in the war for independence (see Handem 2008: 
153-154; Semedo 2011: 109-110; and Temudo 2008). By the middle of the 1980s, their 
overrepresentation in the security forces had become a point of political contention. 
Shortly following independence, purges and executions, with the clear involvement of 
members of the security forces, targeting chieftains, former soldiers of the colonial army 
and opponents to the ruling regime were carried out. Political and military structures 
were amalgamated from the very beginning, a fact that is also evident considering that 
many former military commanders later went on to assume political positions. One of the 
most prominent commanders in the war for independence, João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira, 
was (co-)responsible for carrying out the first successful coup in 1980. He ascended to the 
role of Guinea-Bissau’s authoritarian head of state and would rule the country until 1999. 
Vieira and his supporters therewith established a precedent for subsequent overthrows 
and coups in which military representatives would often collaborate with politicians. Ever 
since, supposed or actual enemies have been forcibly eliminated time and again in 
addition to repeated serious human rights abuses and a disregard for national laws (see 
Handem 2008: 151).  
While central structures, processes and terminology relevant to the security sector 
were borrowed from the former colonial power (such as the judicial police common to 
Portugal), following independence, many police and military officers were sent for 
training to various friendly socialist countries (the Soviet Union/Russia, Cuba, 
Czechoslovakia, North Korea, East Germany, etc.). In the mid-1990s, France assisted 
Guinea-Bissau in establishing a quick response police unit; bilateral cooperation with 
Angola, Brazil and Portugal was added starting in the new millennium. In a historical 
perspective, this points to differing training levels and contents. Within the legal sector, 
the Portuguese were involved in establishing a law faculty in Bissau in the early 1990s. 
French and Portuguese engagement at this time must be considered in light of opposing 
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geopolitical interests of the two former colonial powers in Guinea-Bissau. Bissau-Guinean 
authorities executed at least two retirement cycles in the 1980s and early 1990s to force 
redundant and under-qualified veterans from the war of independence into retirement. 
Although political liberalization in 1994 led to multi-party elections, the civil war that 
broke out soon after marked the start of a phase of political instability that has persisted to 
this day. The civil war that was commonly termed a “military conflict” began in June 1998 
and lasted until May 1999. A military junta opposed president Vieira, which, along with a 
majority of the population, accused him of corruption, smuggling light weapons and 
making deals with the neighboring countries of Senegal and Guinea. The junta managed to 
attract many veterans from the war for independence along with young fighters. The civil 
war set the foundations for increasing political instability that climaxed in the governmental 
overthrow in April 2012 (International Crisis Group 2012; Kohl 2013). This coup resulted 
in the implementation of the Security Sector Reform Programme supported by the EU, 
CPLP (Community of Portuguese Language Countries), the USA, Brazil and UN Peace-
Building Funds that is still in progress today.  
In summary, it is evident that heterogeneity of the educational and training programs 
along with the generally low level of professionalization has become a common thread 
within Guinea-Bissau’s security sector since 1974. Additionally, the country’s development 
has since been fundamentally impacted by a security sector marked by violence and 
authoritarianism that has repeatedly led to violent conflict since independence. 
3. Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau  
3.1 The context 
In the wake of the civil war, many untrained personnel poured into Guinea Bissau’s 
security forces, further diminishing this institution’s overall capacities. Upon the war’s 
commencement, the strength of the military spiraled out of control: due to arbitrary 
recruiting measures, the number of soldiers doubled from 5,000 in 1997 to 11,000 
(Herbert 2003: 22; Handem 2008: 153-154). A recently conducted military census 
confirms that the number of officers is disproportional to the number of rank and file 
soldiers. Observers conjecture that primarily uneducated young soldiers who are socially 
disadvantaged – including a great number of Balanta – strive for acceptance, power and 
access to money from illegal channels through their military service. Overthrows, a lack of 
discipline and private vendettas characterize the inner life of the armed forces, while a 
number of leading officers and their entourages (Reitano/Shaw 2013; 3) have presumably 
been involved in drug and weapon trafficking since 2005, and, more recently, in illicit 
logging and timber trafficking. Furthermore, officers have had control of the Bissauan 
port authority since the end of the military conflict, allowing them to bypass the customs 
authorities when importing goods. Concurrently, soldiers continue to be poorly paid, life 
in the barracks along with living conditions are still precarious, and education remains 
inadequate (Handem 2008: 153). Similar conditions exist within the police squads – often 
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an assembly of former soldiers – that are marred by under-financing, low pay (Handem 
2008: 154), and many unqualified police officers. Bribery along with overlapping or 
unclear competences among the numerous police units are additional problems. Access 
to the legal system continues to be difficult or altogether lacking: courts in the interior of 
the country are either slow or do not operate at all, there are hardly any attorneys or other 
sorts of legal assistance and consulting, and processing fees pose a great burden to the 
population which is generally poor. Intimidation by judges and attorneys, favoritism, a 
lack of judges and state attorneys, and a nearly complete collapse of legal infrastructure in 
rural areas all create grave problems (see Liga Guineense dos Direitos Humanos 2013). In 
the eyes of many citizens, the legal system is seen to be corrupt and inefficient, which is 
partially true. Appealing to “traditional” or religious leaders and elders to resolve conflicts is 
therefore frequently a preferred alternative. As victims of crimes are often interested in 
resolving matters quickly, the police regularly assumes the role of “jurisdiction on site”, 
thereby overstepping the limits of their legal mandate. 
3.2 Too many cooks ... 
A “reform carousel” (see the policy-oriented overview in the Security Council Report 2013: 
17-22) began to turn immediately following the military conflict in 1999. Until that point, 
efforts within the security sector did not operate under the title of “security sector reform”. 
Moreover, key concepts such as “peace building”, and “demobilization, disarmament and 
reintegration” (DDR) first appeared in Guinea-Bissau starting in 1999.  
Since its inception in the 1990s, the concept of security sector reform became a popular 
catchphrase within the donor community. Influential normative definitions of this terminus 
technicus were presented by the UN and the OECD (OECD 2007: 5;  United Nations 
General Assembly Security Council 2008: 5-6). According to this definition, security sector 
reform does not only target structures, institutions and personnel within the armed forces 
and police, but likewise the legal system, customs, prisons, border protection, the secret 
service as well as official supervisory committees, relevant ministries and the legislative 
branch. Furthermore, such reforms can also encompass non-state actors such as guerilla 
groups, private security contractors, civil society groups and “traditional” legal systems. This 
is evidence to the complex nature of these reforms – though the focus of reforms in Guinea-
Bissau was, for a long time, placed on the police and the military. The legal sector has only 
begun to assume a more central role in the past several years. Security sector reform is not 
only supposed to lead to good governance, sustainable security, the rule of law and local 
leadership responsibility but to socio-economic development as well (OECD 2005: 20; 2007: 
21). Indeed, this concept has turned into a “playground” for members of the armed forces 
from the global North in recent years. As military personnel from Europe independently 
confirmed during my interviews, ever since budgets for military spending began shrinking 
in recent years, there has been pressure to find alternative sources of income and areas of 
activity. As one high-ranking officer involved in security sector reform explained, there has 
been “growing demand for [qualified] personnel.” Training and education courses are one 
way to serve the market. On the other hand, there has also been a trend to “market” 
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anything possible as a form of “security sector reform” (Sedra 2010: 113-114) in order to tap 
into new sources of financing. Conversely, some projects and programs within security 
sector reform are not formally labeled as such being that they draw from different budgets 
(e.g. cooperation within the legal system) or because they are not considered to be part of 
security sector reform in a strict sense (e.g. DDR programs or purely police and military 
armament programs). 
Such a convoluted reform carousel influenced by various interests and many parallel and 
consecutive projects can also be found in Guinea-Bissau. One DDR program commissioned 
by the World Bank following the end of the military conflict ended in failure when the 
erratically governing prime minister at the time, Kumba Yalá (2000-2003), misappropriated 
the injected funds (Herbert 2003: 22). After three failed DDR attempts, the explicitly titled 
commencement of security sector reforms in Guinea-Bissau can be dated to 2005 (Hutton 
2010: 195). At the time, the scope of the security sector reforms was initially limited as it 
exclusively addressed the areas of the military and the police (Hutton 2010: 196). An 
international donor conference that took place in Geneva in 2006 passed a national strategy 
for reforming the armed forces in Guinea-Bissau (Republic of Guinea Bissau 2006) which 
ultimately resulted in the “Security Sector Reform Plan of Action for the Restructuring and 
Modernization of the Security and Defence Sector” (Peacebuilding Commission 2008: 3). 
However, according to critics, “security sector reform” was merely a guise meant to ensure 
international support, obeying a bureaucratic rather than a political logic and largely 
omitting a broadly based needs assessment (Hutton 2010: 198). Moreover, some donors, 
like China and Nigeria, have limited their support for the security sector to visible but 
hardly sustainable actions such as the donation of vehicles, equipment, uniforms and a 
military hospital. 
From this point forward, many different actors proceeded to involve themselves in the 
plan, thereby looking to establish various focus areas – often in rapid succession. These 
activities have occasionally proven highly confusing: Overlap has regularly resulted, and 
relations among the donors have been characterized by competition or even mutual 
aversion, which has made exchange difficult or outright impossible. Problems and failures 
have been hidden behind the formal, bureaucratic (see Hutton 2010: 198) and smoothed-
over language of official reports. An overview of the central actors shall be presented in the 
section that follows (a relatively good, though not comprehensive, overview can also be 
found at: ISSAT n.d.: 10-12). 
United Nations 
As in other places, the UN does not comprise a homogenous actor for security sector 
reforms in Guinea-Bissau. Rather, the organization’s presence is characterized by numerous 
programs, agencies and offices that concurrently work alongside one another within the 
SSR area. The most important organizations will be outlined here. 
Assuming a leading role in the area of security sector reform is UNIOGBIS, the “United 
Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau”, which was established in 1999 
as the “United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau” (UNOGBIS) (for 
current areas of engagement, see United Nations Security Council 2013). UNIOGBIS 
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currently carries out short-term training courses in the area of security sector reform and 
has contributed to reworking legislation along with the EU and UNDP (United Nations 
Development Programme).  UNIOGBIS has especially been involved in the area of police 
reform (Mainzinger 2011: 74-76; see Kohl in print). 
UNDP implemented a new program in June 2009 titled the “Rule of Law and Security 
Programme” (Portuguese acronym: FORTES). This project supports a decentralization of 
the judiciary as well as the improvement of legal access, and likewise promotes the 
education of legal professionals along with a mentoring program (UNDP 2011). Since 2011, 
the program has also been involved in establishing legal aid clinics, so-called “Access to 
Justice Centers” (Portuguese acronym: CAJ), in various parts of the country. At these CAJs, 
trained legal professionals who have a mastery of the local language offer consultative 
support to residents on legal matters. Concurrently, CAJ staff members raise awareness 
among women, seniors and so-called “traditional” authorities on the issues of laws and 
human rights (PNUD 2011). Another UNDP measure was the founding of a “National 
Access to Justice Center” (CENFOJ). UNDP also executed an inventory and codification of 
common laws existent among various ethnic groups as well as investigations into access to 
the legal system (PNUD 2011, UNDP 2011: 3-4).  
UNODC, the “United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime”, supported local authorities 
in Guinea-Bissau in establishing a transnational crime unit along with financing a new 
Interpol office in Bissau. Under the auspices of the UNODC, Brazil designed and managed 
a police training center – though its activities were suspended after the coup in 2012. Brazil 
and Portugal provide training to legal officials in the area of criminality in their respective 
countries (de Barros/Godinho Gomes/Correia 2013: 148). UNODC also trains prison 
guards and supports the construction of penal institutions. 
European Union 
In July 2008, the EU mission in support of security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau (EU-
SSR) was initiated under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, based on previous 
work done by the UN. Great Britain dispatched the Security Sector Development Advisory 
Team in 2005 on initiative of this organization. The team carried out a demands assessment 
that led to the creation of the National Security Strategy of 2006. During this probe, 
members of the police and the military were supposedly asked about existing structures and 
working conditions as well as their expectations for the future. The resultant strategy 
document was presented to potential donors at a conference in Geneva in November 2006 
(along with strategies for fighting poverty and investment). The EU conducted its own 
survey in Guinea-Bissau in May and October 2007. These preparations resulted in the 
initiation of the Security Sector Reform Program – according to the official reading – by the 
Bissau-Guinean government in January 2008 (Fiott 2008; Observatoire de l'Afrique 2008; 
Peacebuilding Commission 2008; Bahnson 2013: 261; Girão de Sousa 2013: 43, 50, 53, 89, 
92), and a contract was signed by Guinea-Bissau and the EU in June 2008 (European Union 
2008). The mission, which portrayed itself as being highly ambitious, concentrated on 
reforms within the armed forces and the police. Its main aims were to overhaul the legal 
framework, to plan the reorganization and restructuring of the police and security forces, to 
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train the armed forces, and to renew as well as supply armaments and infrastructure (Fiott 
2008; Observatoire de l'Afrique 2008; Peacebuilding Commission 2008; Girão de Sousa 
2013). The legal sector was by far the smallest component of the EU-SSR; original plans 
refer to the intended revision and reformulation of relevant laws and the rehabilitation of 
the legal infrastructure. One reason for this was that the EU had been implementing a 
separate legal program called PAOSED (Portuguese acronym for “Support Program for the 
Sovereignty and State Law Associations/ Organizations in Guinea-Bissau”), the staff of 
which explicitly did not want to consider the project as belonging to security sector reform. 
Cooperation between EU Council instruments (reforming the armed forces in active 
service) and the EU Commission (the remaining elements) proceeded without any friction 
(Bahnson 2013: 267). 
The EU-SSR was prematurely terminated in September 2010. The main trigger for this 
was the internal overthrow of the supreme commander of Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces, 
who had been a supporter of the reforms; the position was filled by António Indjai, who had 
initiated the overthrow and was critical of reforms. The current commander has been 
accused of fickleness, manipulability and maintaining close connections to the drug trade. 
Well-informed circles report that the UN deemed EU-SSR to stand in competition to its 
own efforts, which would go on to sour relations between the two parties in Guinea-Bissau 
in the long term. Furthermore, UNIOGBIS and the EU were not in agreement as to the 
(re)structuring of the police. The conflict erupted following the establishment of a national 
guard (see Girão de Sousa 2013: 78). Insiders have reported that the mission was rashly 
agreed upon on initiative from Portugal, Spain and France. By way of security sector 
reforms, the EU had hoped to bolster the country against drug trafficking and illegal 
migration (Gya/Fiott/Vainio 2008), which primarily affected South European countries. 
MISSANG 
In August 2010, once EU-SSR was terminated, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West 
African States) concluded the “Guinea-Bissau Security Sector Reform Road Map”. Angola 
assumed the main financial load and campaigned for security sector reforms both bilaterally 
and along with the CPLP (Omoregie 2010: 2-3; Sousa Galito 2011: 4-5). Within the 
framework of an initial cooperation project between ECOWAS and CPLP, Angola, as a 
CPLP member, dispatched the “Angolan Military Mission in Guinea Bissau” in spring 2011 
(Portuguese acronym: MISSANG). Together with many structural rehabilitation and new 
construction measures within the police and the military, Angola provided training for 
Bissau-Guinean police officers in Luanda, some of whom would later go on to assume the 
role of trainers in Bissau. This situation begs the question as to Angola’s capacity – as a 
country that is solvent yet accused of human rights violations and autocratic structures – to 
carry out security sector reforms. Though the Angolan MISSANG representatives were 
broadly popular among residents, doubt propagated among political opposition and the 
Bissau-Guinean military as to the true motives of the Angolan mission. Portions of the 
opposition, who maintained close contacts with high-ranking military officials, accused 
MISSANG of aiming to take possession of Guinea-Bissau’s natural resources in the name of 
Angola. A more serious accusation was that Angola was supporting MISSANG to ensure 
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that the democratically elected, pro-Angolan government would hold onto to power by all 
means necessary, thereby breaching the democratic rules of the game. Oppositional 
criticism towards Angola intensified in 2011-2012 as ECOWAS distanced itself from 
MISSANG – an act that again highlighted the political nature of security sector reform. The 
background for this was the challenge perceived among ECOWAS member states posed by 
Angola’s alleged economic (oil, bauxite, wood) and geopolitical ambitions in the region (as 
a balancing power against Senegal and Nigeria). Following threats from Guinea-Bissau’s 
military command, the mission was shelved prior to the coup in 2012, and MISSANG was 
withdrawn by June 2012 and replaced by ECOWAS troops (see Kohl 2013). As with the 
EU-SSR, many projects were never completed due to hasty termination. 
ECOWAS 
In mid-2012, ECOWAS dispatched ECOMIB (“ECOWAS Mission in Guinea Bissau”) – 
titled a peace mission – which conducted a new needs analysis for reforming the Bissau-
Guinean military through the end of 2012. This was carried out in the context of the 
“Defence and Security Sector Reform Programme” (ECOWAS 2013). According to official 
statements, this program intends to revive and provide the corresponding financing for 
pension funds, which had been years in planning, for soldiers forced from service. The 
establishment of a pension fund had failed in previous years due to disagreement within the 
International Community as to financing matters. However, no actions were taken 
following these announcements, which can be traced back to the tense financial situation 
facing ECOWAS and its members. Most residents of the capital raise an eyebrow to the fact 
that though ECOMIB officially exists in order to stabilize the country and that it is stationed 
in Bissau, it has not yet been present during any of the incidents involving politicians or the 
military. As Bissau-Guineans have repeatedly emphasized during my interviews with them, 
from the perspective of large portions of the population, the Bissau-Guinean armed forces 
and the politicians that cooperate with them are, in fact, the security problem, and less so 
the populace itself. Overall, since ECOWAS is perceived to be a supporter, even an initiator, 
of the coup in April 2012, the ECOMIB mission is met with little acceptance among many 
Bissau-Guineans. Similar to Angola, ECOWAS continues to remain silent about concrete 
steps for security sector reform. As in the case of Angola, publicity and willingness to share 
information has been limited. 
Main security sector reform actor and their areas of activity 
 Armed forces Policy Judiciary 
United Nations X X X 
European Union X X X 
MISSANG / Angola X X  
ECOMIB / ECOWAS X   
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3.3 ... spoil the broth: an analysis 
As this brief overview makes apparent, various actors attempted to execute differing 
security sector reforms within the context of complex political conflict. National as well as 
international actors have differing policies and priorities (Omoregie 2010: 6-7), pursue 
openly and at times opposing interests, and have hidden agendas that span from 
geopolitical interests, envy and competitive mentalities up to simple ambitions for power. 
Mistrust between ECOWAS and other donors runs deep: Staff from international 
organizations working in Bissau doubt ECOWAS’ capacity to carry out security sector 
reforms. According to them, ECOWAS representatives are hardly even familiar with the 
concept of security sector reform. Indeed, by late 2014, ECOWAS has done little to 
nothing in terms of security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau. On the other hand, 
ECOWAS criticizes hitherto efforts made by the UN and the EU as being “imposed”. All 
of this again demonstrates the polarization that exists within the security sector reform 
complex as well as the trenches that developed immediately after the coup between 
ECOWAS and the transitional government on one side and the UN, African Union (AU), 
EU and CPLP on the other. This conflict between both camps stems from the conviction 
held by the International Community and parts of the populace that ECOWAS supported 
the coup in April 2012, which led to the resultant and not democratically legitimized 
“transitional government” – the government was not recognized by the UN, AU, EU or 
CPLP. Within this context, the then head of UNIOGBIS – the former president of East 
Timor who was named to this position at the beginning of 2013 –, José Ramos-Horta, was 
accused by observers of pursuing a pro-ECOWAS course, which could be due to the 
advisors he appointed, many of whom hail from ECOWAS countries. It was only in the 
run-up to free and fair general elections held in April and May 2014 that a rapprochement 
took place between UN, AU, EU, and CPLP, on the one hand, and ECOWAS, on the 
other. 
Mutual blame for the failure of diverse reform attempts can be heard everywhere in the 
“den of serpents” in Bissau. Every party involved in the reforms harbors its own “theory” 
and “recipe” about how better to do things. Though only very few of those involved, for 
obvious reasons, officially admit that these sorts of difficulties exist, such problems are dealt 
with in depth behind closed doors. Representatives from international organizations, for 
example, officially deny coordination problems by referring to existing inter-institutional 
coordination committees within security sector reforms (see Fiott 2008: 2; Omoregie 2010: 
2). In confidential talks, representatives from the Bissau-Guinean side, on the other hand, 
complain of prolonged processes and the fact that donors leave them in the dark about 
future proceedings. This is evidence of coordination problems and participation deficits. At 
present, coordination of reform efforts seems to be lacking between the two camps 
(ECOWAS vs. the UN, AU, EU, CPLP) – relations have been tense in the wake of the coup. 
However, coordination among donors – nominally controlled by a steering committee – 
was also insufficient during EU-SSR times, as those involved came to realize early on 
(Gomes 2009: 27-28; Girão de Sousa 2013: 101-105). This may have been further 
complicated on account of competing, complex institutions within the EU (see Helly 2006; 
Sherriff 2008) and within UN systems. Indeed, the security sector reform milieu within the 
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UN is marked by increasing differentiation: regularly new committees and organizational 
units engage in security sector reform or are created from anew, further obscuring the 
overview. A Security Sector Reform Task Force established in 2007 is tasked with 
coordinating the work of a total of 14 agencies (United Nations General Assembly Security 
Council 2013: 3, 16-17, 22-23). Time will tell if this attempt by the UN to bundle the 
interests and efforts of units working on security sector reform will prove tenable. 
Improved coordination and cooperation is not only encumbered from a synchronic 
perspective but also from a diachronic one owing to the fact that actors and programs in 
Guinea-Bissau have continuously been changed over time. The lack of an overall 
approach is evident on the practical level: As an example, police officers sent to Angola 
are trained according to the local curriculum there, whereas those trained in Bissau 
receive a Brazilian curriculum. Even back in the 1980s and 1990s, Bissau-Guinean police 
officers were trained in the Soviet Union and East and West Germany while France 
trained officers for rapid response units. Consequently, since police work is generally not 
standardized (Mainzinger 2011: 68), police officers trained according to differing 
curricula possess disparate knowledge. 
In the following chapter, I examine the differences that exist between official reform 
demands within the security sector in Guinea-Bissau and its practical implementation 
from a Bissau-Guinean perspective. 
4. The Problem of Local Ownership 
4.1 The cleft between demands and practice 
One of the central demands in executing security sector reforms is local ownership 
(“apropriação local” in Portuguese). Despite the fact that a definition of this technical 
term, which implies “more than mere participation” (OECD 2007: 64), is overdue, most 
authors agree (Nathan 2007: 4) that security sector reform should be conducted by local 
actors (as according to the “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness”, 2005 and the “Accra 
Agenda for Action”, 2008, as well; both in OECD, n.d.). They agree that a people-centered 
approach can contribute to improving the grounding and acceptance of such reforms 
(Oosterveld/Garland 2012: 197).  
How has local ownership been implemented in Guinea-Bissau in the framework of 
security sector reforms? External observers were early to emphasize the (surely 
exaggerated) criticism that the EU-SSR represented an imposed military intervention 
from abroad (Telatin 2009), which practically transformed Guinea-Bissau into a UN 
protectorate (Marischka 2008). One of the decisive factors identified as contributing to 
the failure of the EU-SSR (see Bloching 2010) was a complete lack of local ownership 
(Hutton 2010: 198). The Eurocentric outlook assumed that its definition of reform was 
congruent with that of the Bissau-Guineans (Gya/Thomsen 2009: 3). As such, the EU-
SSR, as well as other peace-building initiatives in the country found themselves “under 
the ownership” of the International Community (Roque 2009: 2; Girão de Sousa 2013: 
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88). Critical points of view refer to Guinea-Bissau’s strategy document, which itself 
purportedly accords to the demands, principles and approaches of the International 
Community. The complexity of security sector reforms was, according to this line of 
argument, underestimated. Furthermore, international actors were not familiar enough 
with local realities; they did not seem to have anticipated the degree of resistance from 
groups within the security forces and politics. The latter groups rightly feared that the 
reforms would distance them from power and privilege (Gomes 2009: 28-29).  
What has the EU’s stance been to this criticism? When asked about considering the 
principle of local ownership in the wake of the EU-SSR, one EU interview partner reacted 
with irritation. He explained that local ownership was, of course, applied according to set 
guidelines and referred to the strategy document from 2006 and the plan for security 
sector reform passed by the Bissau-Guinean parliament in 2008. However, as the EU-SSR 
progressed further, the EU no longer paid heed to local ownership as the reforms 
proceeded only with reference to the strategy that had been agreed upon, as my interview 
partner argued. Once the national security strategy was drafted in 2006 and the EU 
mission commenced in 2008, members of the military and police seem to have had little 
to no involvement in the reform process and were likewise not kept abreast about 
concrete steps being taken. This was perhaps not only the fault of the EU but likewise of 
Bissau-Guinean leadership; it does, however, point to poor communication and exchange 
of information (see Girão de Sousa 2013: 99-100). During our interviews, many Bissau-
Guineans who work for the police or the military expressed their incomprehension in 
being left in the dark about the approaches and steps taken by the EU-SSR. Former EU-
SSR staff confirmed that many Bissau-Guineans who were formally involved in the 
security sector reforms were completely uninformed about the scope of the project. 
Correspondingly, most government and security sector representatives were clearly 
unaware of the consequences that signing the strategy document would have, assuming 
they had any knowledge of the document at all (see Bahnson 2013: 265; Girão de Sousa 
2013: 74-75). When the new Minister of Defense, apparently under pressure from the 
military, unilaterally changed the structure of the reform committee in 2009, outrage 
ensued on the side of the EU. According to EU representatives, this entailed a breach of 
the strategy document, in which the structure of the committee had bindingly been 
established. Shortly thereafter, the minister declared changes in the newly planned target 
strength of the armed forces and called for a revision of the new bipartite police structure 
(Girão de Sousa 2013: 77-78). Though this could be interpreted as a breach of contract, as 
the EU had, other interpretations are also possible. It is feasible to assume that as time 
progressed, those possessing formal authority in Bissau recognized the meaning behind 
and potential dangers inherent in the envisioned reforms and attempted to redirect them. 
After they were excluded from effective participation in planning the reforms and were 
kept unaware of their scope, the inflexibility of the strategy set by the EU blocked further 
involvement. Considering these differences between the “is” and the “should be” in terms 
of local involvement, it is no wonder that the strategy document from 2006 – to which my 
interview partner from EU ranks in early 2013 repeatedly referred – was, over the years, 
never realized or adapted to given conditions or requirements in cooperation with 
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authorities and civil society. Instead, my interview partner insisted on maintaining strict 
adherence to the agreed-upon goals in from the 2006 strategy.  
While the security sector reform and the management of local participation channels 
by actors from the North, such as the UN and the EU, have been relatively well 
documented, there has been a lack of transparency among other donors. This makes 
judging the inclusion of local perspectives and needs within reform planning and 
execution difficult. Though Angola’s engagement, for instance, was welcomed by 
residents and many police officers and soldiers, its local inclusion strategies remain 
largely shrouded, which is also the case for concrete measures. It seems as though Angola 
intended to offset an alleged lack of local participation by way of one-sided, pro-Angolan 
reporting on television. ECOWAS representatives likewise indicated commitment to local 
ownership in the interviews, though details about concrete steps were also unclear here. 
One of the few visible measures included inspections of army barracks conducted by the 
ECOWAS military in 2012-2013 for carrying out a needs assessment. 
Indeed, few people in Guinea Bissau are even familiar with idea of local ownership, be 
it among civil society or the security sector. This knowledge is limited to experts actively 
working in the area of security sector reform in international organizations, NGOs or 
authorities that deal with the issue. 
This situation is also reflected in the fact that Bissau-Guinean knew very little about 
the security sector reforms. Even members of the police and military first associated them 
with the forced retirement of older and redundant colleagues. This comes as no surprise 
as “reforma” can mean both “reform” and “retirement” in Portuguese and Guinea-
Bissau’s lingua franca Kriol (see Gya/Thomsen 2009: 3). Ideas related to “security” remain 
vague and heterogeneous: Many Bissau-Guineans, especially supporters of the 
government deposed in 2012, were convinced that the overall security situation worsened 
after the coup. Other interview partners identified positive outcomes that they frequently 
associated with the deposed government. Many were also of the opinion that, all in all, 
little had changed. Numerous segments of the populace tended to be unsure as to how the 
security situation had developed and how it could improve, whereas corruption and 
perceived insecurity remain central issues. The interviews made clear that security sector 
reform is not a crucial issue in itself. Nonetheless, security, criminality and corruption are 
regularly debated. Citizens speak little (if at all) about the possibilities and contents of a 
security sector reform. In general, few worry about the current, or possible, 
implementation of such a reform, pointing to insufficient awareness-raising and 
medialization. However, agreement exists among Bissau-Guineans that a way out of the 
political and security-related impasse can only be found with help from the international 
community: only foreign countries can help in restoring order. As such, portions of the 
populace therewith implicitly concede opportunities for involvement. This particularly 
occurs when they appeal to broadly disseminated self-victimization discourses directed at 
the state (see Kohl/Schroven 2014) that deprive Bissau-Guinean of the capacity to create 
change themselves. 
The newly formed national guard – an outcome of the security sector reform – has 
been overtly welcomed, at least in the capital of Bissau. A number of civilian respondents 
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explicitly liked the martial appearance of the national guard, whereas interviewees from 
the UN blamed the institution for human rights violations. The former deemed this a 
positive sign compared to recently dispatched youth gangs (“scomae”) that drew from 
examples in Brazilian and Mexican telenovelas broadcast locally. These gangs had become 
involved in theft, robbery and, allegedly, drug trafficking in recent times and were 
likewise hired as “party armies” for certain political parties. One constant problem 
identified by many Bissau-Guineans was corruption within the police and legal system – 
most visibly embodied in the traffic police taking bribes along the roadsides. The military 
also has a very negative, though, at the same time, ambivalent, image. Efforts to renew 
barracks – carried out, in part, by Angola – and improve living standards were praised, yet 
the military’s reputation still suffers greatly as a result of the coup, drug trafficking 
conducted by certain individuals and repeated human rights abuses. Their image was also 
tarnished by the supreme commander of the armed forces, António Indjai, who was 
dismissed by the new democratic government in September 2014; he was seen as being a 
“strong man” acting behind the scenes and had a bad reputation among the populace. 
Concurrently, however, the military receives historical recognition as the liberator of the 
nation. The legal system is stricken with insufficient resources and likewise has a poor 
reputation among the populace due to corrupt practices and protracted and delayed legal 
proceedings. The interior of the country is largely devoid of a legal system; here, jurisdiction 
is realized by non-state mediators, elders, chiefs, religious leaders, etc. or assumed by the 
police. Many Bissau-Guineans have already heard of the Access to Justice Centers (CAJ) 
founded by UNDP; those who have made use of them positively rate their consulting and 
support services.  
For years, there has been talk in Guinea Bissau of initiating a “national dialog”; UNDP 
organized a forum and regional conference with locals in 2011 with this goal in mind. In 
contrast to other large security sector reform projects, UNDP attempted to place civil 
society at the center of the process. Corresponding conferences were said to have been 
organized in all of Guinea-Bissau’s sectors (similar to counties) with the help of “peace 
brigades”. These brigades comprised mainly of young people who were engaged in 
community-based organizations – and explicitly not NGOs distant from the localities – at 
the village level, aiming to raise awareness for security sector reform among residents and 
motivate them to submit ideas and suggestions for the reforms. A national conference was 
to be organized as a concluding event for this process, though this was never realized on 
account of the death of the prime minister and the coup in early 2012. Even though this 
ambitious program did succeed in making a vital statement for involving civil society into 
the reform process, it ultimately seems to have borne little fruit: No results have been 
reported nor did Bissau-Guineans take notice of the conferences. UNDP staff kept largely 
silent about the conferences. This is surprising considering that UNDP has, in fact, 
submitted well-founded reports in the context of related projects in Guinea-Bissau. This 
includes a study on access to the legal system that essentially draws from local field 
research (Guerreiro 2011: 3-4). A similar situation exists with UNDP’s legal sector reform 
program: In October 2010, UNDP organized working groups and a concluding forum in 
Bissau in order to achieve a “participative consensus” among the judiciary, civil society 
and International Community in reference to priorities for the legal sector (Ministério de 
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Justiça 2011a: 5-6) – the results of the needs analysis were compiled by an external 
consultant. The outcome of this process included a “strategic plan” and a “national 
strategy” (2010-2015) for the legal sector that was approved by the government in January 
2011 (Ministério de Justiça 2011a, 2011b). Individuals that I interviewed – who have held 
mid-level positions in the judiciary for years – admitted that they had no knowledge of 
this forum. 
The UNDP staff members with whom I had contact showed themselves to generally be 
very dedicated to the local ownership principle, claiming to put effort into implementing 
projects in a participative a way as possible. They did, however, admit that processes were 
at times too slow and that, for the sake of acceleration, they had to turn up the pressure, 
and this included the contracting of consultants. 
Nevertheless, despite efforts by UNDP, the impression remained intact that – as with 
the EU – local ownership is conceived as a selective input at the very beginning of a 
project and not as a continuous process. The group of people involved in, or rather 
informed about, such processes termed “participative” remained limited – supposedly due 
to insufficient media and communication strategies. Yet, apart from financial and time-
related obstacles, what reasons are there for not more broadly considering local options 
for involvement in the area of security sector reform? One international expert whom I 
interviewed said that NGOs, which follow a decidedly foundational-work strategy in their 
projects with members of the security forces, were at risk of being manipulated by them. 
Statements made by one UN staff member who had worked on security sector reforms in 
Bissau accorded to this. During a confidential interview, he even explicitly warned me 
about too much local participation, and referred to the model police station that 
UNIOGBIS had been built in an unsettled neighborhood in Bissau (see Mainzinger 2011: 
77). During the project’s first attempt, money was embezzled by local institutions, forcing 
construction to commence during a renewed attempt. At the time of our interview, the 
station had supposedly still not been connected to the power grid, which was the blame of 
local officials. Another high-ranking staff member from an international organization 
struck a similar tone, naming East Timor as an example for Guinea Bissau. The UN had, 
on occasion, assumed authority over the police in East Timor; a similar situation would 
be feasible for Guinea Bissau, meaning that the UN should take over control of the 
administration for a period of time. 
Time and again, the basic stance of my idealistic and hands-on interview partners 
from international organizations exhibited frustration with not being able to achieve their 
goals of creating functioning police and military structures – in a European sense – in 
Guinea-Bissau due to local “intransigence”, blockades, neglect, disinterest, insufficient 
capacity and lacking support. From this perspective, local ownership is more of a 
hindrance than an opportunity. Co-determination can here be interpreted as negative for 
planning and implementation of security sector reforms when the expertise and 
independence of experts is doubted and the doors are opened for manipulation at every 
turn. The problem of insufficient local capacities also cannot be totally dismissed. 
However, time-intensive dialog processes (ones that actually deserve the title) and 
foundational work should be carried out in the stead of largely prefabricated reform 
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processes. Foreign expertise in the security sector should go hand in hand with the social, 
cultural and pedagogic accompaniment of reform programs. One decisive aspect for local 
ownership and capacity development is the degree to which local perspectives and 
expectations for security sector reform strategies are taken into consideration. 
4.2 A lack of embedding of projects and international experts 
The rash progress and short duration of security sector reform programs has resulted in a 
lack of personnel and technical continuity – and not only in Guinea-Bissau. International 
experts are usually employed for limited contracts, meaning that they have little time to 
become intimately familiar with the reforms and the associated procedures, approaches 
and problems. Furthermore, contact to locals is often superficial and limited to domestic 
helpers and employees of international organizations, NGOs and local authorities; contact 
with “normal” police officers, soldiers and judicial staff remains narrow. It is thus no 
wonder that UN staff knew little about the internals of coups and overthrow attempts in 
Guinea-Bissau. Lacking local roots, they had to repeatedly inquire about the underlying 
causes from grassroots NGOs in order to be able to provide headquarters in New York 
with a competent report. Since international experts have few local acquaintances and are 
only superficially familiar with the political situation, they have been forced to rely on 
local intermediaries. The latter share commonalities with development agents, and they 
use strategic contacts in an attempt to steer external financing in local social arenas 
(Olivier de Sardan/Bierschenk 1993). International experts have become dependent on 
such intermediaries who may be prone to pursuing their own interests. In the context of 
security sector reform in Guinea Bissau, sub-par familiarity with local social 
constellations as well as cultural understandings, meanings and patterns of action among 
international experts also plays a role. When such “cultural impregnation” (Olivier de 
Sardan 1995) only exists to a limited degree while stubborn and stereotyped technical 
knowledge gains the upper hand (see Donais 2009: 8; Wilén/Chapaux 2011: 545), false 
estimations can arise and impair projects (see Girão de Sousa 2013: 90). The case of 
former Prime Minister Carlos Domingos Gomes Júnior illustrates this: As one of the 
main supporters of reforming the security sector, he served in Portugal’s colonial army 
prior to Guinea-Bissau’s independence. He first joined the long-governing PAIGC party, 
which had emerged from liberation movement, after independence. Among a number of 
military personnel, who equated the legitimacy of the military with its victorious battle 
against colonialism, the idea that Gomes now intended to reform them stirred 
indignation. A similar lack of sensitivity can be found in statements made by a UN 
representative who recommended that military personnel not qualified for service be 
employed as street sweepers. One can only conjecture as to the loss of honor and prestige 
this would have entailed and the amount of opposition it would have created. Within 
military circles, security sector reform was interpreted from a historical colonial reference 
point. A demotion to street sweeper would not only have confirmed this image but also 
strengthened it. 
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The socio-economic needs of security forces were clearly also underestimated. One 
example of this pertains to the pension funds for former armed forces personnel: The 
International Community had debated the modalities and financing of a pension fund for 
military personnel and veterans forced into retirement for years. Many members of the 
security sector would indeed prefer to enter retirement; however, they are currently 
unable to do so since the government effectively has not accumulated any savings for 
pensions. A drawn-out process related to the fund has angered and frustrated many of 
those affected and further undermined the credibility of the donors, who underestimated 
the degree of dissatisfaction among countless military personnel who wanted to retire 
from service. When the civil war began in 1998, many barely trained or capable veterans 
also entered the battle against long-ruling Prime Minister Vieira. They had been placed in 
retirement since the 1980s without receiving a pension, forcing them, from their 
perspective, to take on degrading side work. They saw the war to be an opportunity for 
revenge. Besides these former veterans who have returned to the police and army, new 
“lateral entrants” in these two branches who are not ideologically or ethnically bound 
pose another problem. Well-trained police officers complain of their under-qualification 
and have reported how they are forced to curb their opposition. They trace this back to 
fear among less-qualified coworkers, of losing their status and income in the course of the 
security sector reform. 
The short project and financing cycles mentioned above also create an issue of 
involvement (Nathan 2007: 3; Oosterveld/Garland 2012: 201). This was made especially 
clear as I spoke to a leading employee of the Access to Justice Center (CENFOJ) financed 
by UNDP: By the end of our talk, he explained that UNDP would successively withdraw 
from the project as planned. The plan envisioned that CENFOJ would have to seek other 
financing sources. It was known that the government could not cover the costs; he 
therefore asked me if PRIF could help support the training facility. The CAJ faces a 
similar case of insecure financing. 
Being that the training level is as low as it is and that the projects are rushed on account 
of time pressures, Bissau-Guinean officials are quick to feel overwhelmed and sequester 
themselves. Exclusive and selective involvement measures may contribute to demotivating 
officials and causing them to withdraw. Yet even those better-qualified are not well 
acquainted with their work responsibilities as a result of wide-spread repetitive, cognitive 
instruction methods in a starved education sector. Low and overdue wages in the civil 
service likewise generate few incentives. Additionally, paternalistic relations on the side of 
high-ranking officials and ministers also play a role. They tend to demonstrate their 
putative superiority as so-called “big men”, in the face of foreign experts as well, and operate 
as patrons of clientelistic relations. This leads to administrative processes assuming a 
different logic than in the global North. Well familiar with the urgency and importance of 
requests made, officials sometimes attempt to relegate customers and lower-ranking 
colleagues to the role of clients and petitioners, thereby further complicating and delaying 
processes. 
On the one hand, competent members of the military have expressed dissatisfaction over 
cooperation with the International Community due to insufficient information policies, 
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long waiting times and a domineering presence. Conversely, international experts also 
complain that cooperation is generally difficult: Politicians and administrative staff are often 
very slow, hesitant and incapable, causing frustration and disillusionment among donors. 
Western consultants have often had to fill these holes, such as in drafting laws since many 
parliamentarians are illiterate or poorly educated. Perceived inadequacies in the 
government and administration could partially have to do with lacking understanding 
about local dependencies, interests, and power and patronage structures among experts 
who are frequently idealistic.  
In summary, these facts signify that the insufficient embedding of projects and limited 
knowledge of local culture among international experts can impair the execution of 
security sector reforms, as the case of Guinea-Bissau illustrates. Existing structures and 
socio-cultural conditions in the security sector and bureaucracy do, also, greatly 
contribute to complicating reforms in the affected countries. 
4.3 One-way “transfer” of ideas and concepts 
Another factor in the donor-recipient relationship is intimately related to the worldviews 
and guiding principles held by international staff in the area of security sector reforms. 
Despite affirmations of local ownership, representatives from international organizations 
often explicitly or implicitly assume an approach based in modernization theory and 
cognitivism. What does this mean? Modernization theory assumes that a country’s 
development proceeds linearly, with the global North serving as an ideal to be emulated 
(see Gardner/Lewis 1996: 19). Cognitivism states that knowledge is simply transported 
from a “sender” to a “recipient”, and thus overlooks the complexities of learning and the 
advantages of individual processing.  
Representatives I spoke with were convinced that Guinea-Bissau needs “modern” 
structures that the global North can deliver by way of an example to be copied. This 
attitude has already been made clear in the earlier vignette about the model police station. 
Another interviewee from an international organization argued that international experts 
with experience in state and government building – similar to the case of East Timor – 
were capable of creating “modern” and “efficient” structures. As such, structures in the 
global North are seen to be a template. This conviction has concretely been manifested in 
legislation: Representatives from the International Community openly confessed that 
Portuguese legal experts simply copied parts of Portuguese police and military sector law 
and applied them to the Bissau-Guinean legal framework. I was further told that an 
alleged lack of skills on the Bissau-Guinean side made it necessary for European lawyers 
to carry out this task. 
Educational and training courses are deemed a proven means for affecting capacity 
building and behavioral change among Guinea-Bissau’s security personnel. Experts are 
initially convinced that as soon as course participants have learned the basics of 
professional police and military work as well as democracy and human rights principles, 
they will apply the newly acquired philosophy and cease any corrupt and bad practices. 
Many of these courses only last a few days (e.g. UNIOGBIS) or weeks (e.g. UNODC and 
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Brazil’s police training center), whereas others, such as in Angola and Brazil, are longer 
term. Practitioners are accordingly frustrated when their expectations are not met. One 
telling example is of a Brazilian federal police officer who showed disappointment when 
Bissau-Guinean police did not apply the course contents to the field. He related a story of 
passing through traffic control near Bissau attended by twenty officers; all or part of the 
officers at the checkpoint had previously participated in theoretical and practical training 
at the Brazilian-supported police training center. The Brazilian police officer said that the 
Bissau-Guineans had “forgotten everything” that they tried to teach them at the training 
program. He criticized the approach taken, pointing to a lack of continuity and isolated 
nature of the courses (for a critique of traditional “train and equip” strategies, see 
Mainzinger 2011: 81). Considering this, it is questionable whether longer-term courses 
would change the behavior of the police. Even if police officers were to internalized the 
acquired knowledge according to expectations, fundamental structural deficits persist 
both in the police service (such as overdue wages, coworkers who maintain undesired 
practices, etc.) and in Guinea-Bissau’s public administration in general. In conclusion, the 
Brazilian federal officer mentioned the fact that many police officers – especially younger 
ones, as I observed – are noticeably attracted by material symbols such as fancy cars, 
trendy sunglasses and flashy pants. Such desired self-images might be decisively 
influenced by corresponding “Western”, Nigerian or Far Eastern security force clichés 
seen on television and in online media that police officers may be attempting to “relive” 
locally. 
One effective model transfer was the restructuring of various police units initiated by 
the EU on the basis of the National Security Strategy. Interview partners explained that 
the creation of the national guard drew from Southern European – Portuguese 
(Monteiro/Morgado 2009: 4) and Spanish – experts, being that these countries have 
traditionally possessed such proto-military forces exercising police tasks. Yet old and new 
structures appear to share an awkward coexistence. The EU and the government 
ambitiously set out to reorganize the entire police sector and attempted to integrate 
numerous units (e.g. the border guard, fiscal police, forest protection, etc.) – which had 
formerly existed in parallel, were subordinate to various ministries, and seldom possessed 
clearly defined competences – into the new, expressly militaristic, black uniform-wearing 
national guard. As with the security police – responsible for public order – the national 
guard reports to the Ministry of the Interior; however, the national guard continues, at 
least de jure, to likewise report to the respective, formerly responsible line ministry (a 
double structure). Criticism emerged early on about the national guard potentially 
upsetting the fragile domestic power structures. The national guard “import model” did, 
in fact, politicize the environment: Portions of the military viewed the national guard as 
an oppositional power threatening the military’s existing privileges and roles. They placed 
responsibility for this on Prime Minister Gomes, calling him a “protectee” of the 
International Community who wanted to use Western assistance to limit the influence of 
the military. Following the coup, the national guard, as well as the rest of the police, was 
de facto placed under the control of the military and the supreme military commander. 
Angola, as a representative of the global South, did no better with its own approach to 
security sector reform: It also politicized the process and posed a challenge to the military. 
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This happened insofar as MISSANG used its protégé and supporter, Prime Minister 
Gomes, in an attempt to curb the influence of the military and strengthen Angola’s 
political and economic position in Guinea-Bissau. Criticism here should not, however, be 
placed on the intention to curb the influence of the armed forces, which is indeed the 
main cause for instability in Guinea-Bissau; MISSANG’s imprudent approach was 
objectionable, leaving the impression that it was imposing its own norms and priorities. 
MISSANG failed to suitably account for the great deal opposition within the armed forces 
and politics or try to settling it in advance.  
The politicizing effect of Angolan engagement was also evident in the fact that police 
officers were initially placed under general suspicion by the new military commanders in 
Bissau upon returning from the Angolan police trainer center. They were apparently 
suspected of being “contaminated” by what they learned in Angola and of being allies of 
deposed Prime Minister Gomes and opponents of the military. As relatively well-trained 
police officers, the returnees were therefore initially freed from service in 2012 and only 
integrated into the police forces by early 2014. This alleged “disloyalty” based on the 
curriculum they learned corresponded with the aforementioned fact that the older, less-
qualified counterparts felt threatened by the returnees. 
In a similar vain, the misunderstanding related to Portuguese term “reforma” (reform 
vs. retirement) highlights the various environments, perceptions and interests of the 
International Community on one side and that of the security sector on the other, 
proving that hardly any dialog was pursued. Many Bissau-Guineans, mainly veterans and 
elderly members of the security forces, primarily associated “reforma” in the security 
sector with material improvements in the form of pensions, whereas those in active 
service hoped for new vehicles, IT equipment, etc. This was therefore a material matter 
related to bettering one’s own social status. This illustrates the phenomenon of a desire to 
flaunt and increase one’s social position through conspicuous status symbols that is 
existent in societies marked by serious and rapid social ascent and descent; a 
demonstration of social differentiation from as well as the wish for participation in the 
lifestyle of the global North. In contrast, it was structural aspects that were deemed crucial 
for the International Community, namely the restructuring and professionalization of the 
security forces, the reworking of existing laws, the drafting of new ones, etc. – all based on 
models borrowed from the North. This discrepancy between Bissau-Guinean perceptions 
and expectations and the actual intentions inherent in the reforms can be explained by a 
dearth of communication, both within Guinea-Bissau’s state structures as well as between 
Bissau-Guinean actors and the International Community. 
The “reforma” misunderstanding also posed a problem for security sector reforms in 
another perspective. One insider reminded me of how former State President Vieira had 
gathered the commanders of the armed forces outside of Bissau in 2006 or 2007 to inform 
them that the International Community intended to execute a “reforma”. Many of those 
present, particularly ex-veterans who had reenlisted after 1998-9, felt fatally reminded of 
the “wild” forced retirements during which soldiers were simply sent home without any 
pension benefits. Vieira now stood before some of them again and announced a 
“reforma”, reawakening negative associations among those in attendance; many were 
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completely indignant. This misunderstanding related to the term “reforma” clearly 
reinforced the rejection of and opposition to the reform, even though the supreme 
commander of the armed forces finally announced support for the reform. 
These examples suggest that many experts are prisoners of modernization theory logic 
even though the academic development discourse turned away from this approach decades 
ago (see Gardner/Lewis 1996: 19). How can such a “delay” be explained? Looking at the 
biographies of those practically working on security sector reform, it is evident that many, 
due to the nature of the subject, have an exclusively legal, police or military background. 
This means that they are unfamiliar with development theories as they are received and 
discussed within development cooperation and academia. As such, many security sector 
experts lag behind in applied development cooperation, an area in which practitioners seem 
familiar with recent approaches to development theory, even if they may not actually apply 
them. Were experts in security sector reform to possess a higher degree of knowledge 
about development theories paired with analytically thought-through realizations based 
on related former projects, the reforms would surely be better planned and implemented. 
This would include consideration for self-determined local ownership principles, 
enhanced communication and coordination, and improved cultural embedding of 
projects and international experts. Nevertheless, many international practitioners within 
security sector reform remain largely unreflexive, deeming themselves – from a 
modernization theory perspective – to be emissaries acting in the name of freedom, 
development and civilization. They believe that their noble intentions are neither valued 
nor understood by state authorities in the affected nations of the global South. This was 
illustrated by the official parting words made by the head of the EU-SSR in mid-2010. He 
explained that the people of Guinea-Bissau knew how to traverse the path to peace, 
security, wealth and justice, and that the EU-SSR had contributed to preparing the way. 
Taking this path would help free the Bissau-Guineans, an “agonized people”, from the 
past and the stagnation in which they have sunk for decades. He indirectly added that the 
EU-SSR had represented the inherited and “sacred” values of the EU in Guinea-Bissau, 
namely freedom, dignity and human rights (Juan Esteban Verástegui in: European Union 
Mission for the Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau 2010: 1). 
But to what degree and how rapidly do new ideas penetrate police and military 
institutions in the first place? Interviews in the countryside showed that members of the 
police and military there were even further removed from security sector reform efforts 
than their counterparts in the capital. The observable urban-rural gap in Guinea-Bissau 
and other countries was thus further reinforced in the wake of reform efforts. 
Despite contrasting official rhetoric, many security sector reform projects and their 
staff remain trapped in the one-sided logic of North-South norm and idea transfers; such 
an approach can only be met with limited success. Reforms that are meagerly adapted to 
local needs and demands are bound not to succeed. 
Overall, this chapter has shown how co-determination principles were only selectively 
adapted into security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau for the sake of satisfying formal 
demands for local ownership. Donors blamed the actual lack of inclusion of local 
government, administrative and civil society representatives into the process on insufficient 
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capacities, susceptibility for corruption and limiting timeframes. The EU-SSR proved to be 
very inflexible and did not allow any room for adjustment or subsequent changes to the 
agreed-upon strategy. This meant that the content and approaches of implemented projects 
were often oriented towards guiding principles from the global North. Disparate 
perceptions, interpretations and expectations on both the side of the Bissau-Guineans and 
the International Community were dictated by deficient coordination and a lack of 
communication. In the field itself, donors have abided by the logic of modernization theory, 
leaving little room for locally negotiated reform approaches. 
5. Prospects 
The considerations presented here have highlighted the manifold difficulties and 
deficiencies inherent in previous security sector reform projects in Guinea-Bissau. One of 
the grave pitfalls in this context has been both the size and diversity – diachronic and 
synchronic – of the involved actors along with communication and coordination within 
and among the involved institutions that have exhibited little efficiency. Short project 
cycles, a desire to achieve too much in too little time, a lack of flexibility, holism and 
multi-disciplinarity, and timid financing commitments also had negative impacts. 
Although participation was repeatedly called for, the demand was not sufficiently 
satisfied: civil society and members of the security sector were seldom included. The 
overall impression remains that instead of guaranteeing self-determination, only a 
minimum degree of local co-determination in the form of selective consultations was 
granted. For this reason, differing perceptions and expectations in Guinea-Bissau and 
among the International Community could neither be resolved nor fulfilled. 
The idea of local ownership has, indeed, also been criticized in other national contexts 
(see Reich 2006; Nathan 2007; Donais 2009; Mobekk 2010; Wilén/Chapaux 2011; 
Keane/Downes 2012; Oosterveld/Garland 2012; Richmond 2012): The term is often used 
as mere lip service – it is frequently unclear who the “locals” even are; they do not 
comprise a homogenous mass in possession of a single opinion. Recently, the idea of 
“national” or “governmental” ownership has gained in prominence. Basic as well as 
technical competences related to involvement in reforms are often denied governmental 
representatives by experts, dictated by the logic that donors know best how to plan and 
implement reforms. At international development cooperation training events on security 
sector reforms, local ownership is stressed, yet, in the same breath, the feasibility of 
implementation is said to be limited and subordinated to donor conditionality. Indeed, 
the notion of local ownership seems to serve to cover up asymmetrical power relations 
between the global North and countries of the South. Ultimately, this term frequently 
replaces the idea of “self-determination” since governments in the South hardly have a 
choice in what they can claim “ownership” of. In other words, local ownership can be 
seen as a code for behavioral conditioning serving to guarantee abidance by countries in 
the global South (Richmond 2012: 358-360, 372). 
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Last but not least, politicization, misunderstandings, limitations stemming from 
occupational biographies and deficient “cultural impregnation” of international actors have 
likewise contributed to the wanting results of security sector reforms. As such, “security 
sector reform with dignity” (Omoregie 2010) – as spoken by the former commander-in-
chief of Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces – was not achieved. On the contrary, when 
considering the complexity and diversity of security sector reforms, the draining of funds, 
a perception of being excluded from and overrun by processes, a fear of change and 
unknown outcomes, and paternalistic mindsets operating within associated patronage 
networks, lacking capacities and excessive demands on the Bissau-Guinean side were also 
detrimental to previous reform attempts (see Mainzinger 2011: 69, 78). 
Alternative approaches could start by facilitating broad public discussions and 
improving inclusion of differing local perspectives in order to create flexible reform 
strategies – with involvement by experts with various qualifications. Additionally, 
concrete utility must be presented to the affected staff within the security sector; rather 
than receiving mere theoretical information in courses, stakeholders must experience 
innovation in the field, termed “knowledge in practice” (Hills 2012: 742, 754). The causes 
of fear and opposition from politics and among the ranks of the security sector should be 
consistently addressed and plans should be explained and executed bit by bit in order for 
participants to overcome anxieties related to unknown processes and changes (see 
Vermaak 2012: 237, 243). 
There are, however, obstacles that cannot be overcome in the short term. One serious 
situation relates to the fact that former reform attempts contributed to unsettling and 
destabilizing the political environment in Guinea-Bissau. Previous measures and failures 
have tended to aggravate mistrust and critical stances to any reform attempts among 
some segments of government, the police and the military. This is problematic since 
majority support is essential for reforms. Furthermore, how can coordination be 
enhanced when central international actors are found to pursue contrasting (geo-
strategic) interests? Structural constraints on the donor side comprise a crucial factor that 
leaves little hope for a change in approaches to security sector reform among large 
organizations such as the UN and the EU. It seems unlikely that changes will occur in 
relation to short project cycles, stubborn project planning and limited finances that must 
repeatedly be renegotiated. 
A more fundamental question arises as to whether an adaptation to current local 
demands and perspectives, in regards to local co- and self-determination, would actually 
have achieved more. People have to “fight to get by” in many areas of life in Guinea-
Bissau (termed “dubri” in the local lingua franca). This includes norms set by the state 
which are often negotiable to a certain degree in local social practice. It is therefore no 
wonder that the members of the police and military I surveyed prioritized material 
structural factors over organizational ones. Reform projects must therefore much more 
essentially consider socio-economic fears and demands in order to win over those 
affected. Additionally, increasing the standard of education and training is fundamental 
for ensuring that adequate prerequisites for executing reforms exist into the long term; 
even high-ranking officers only possess rudimentary school education, if any at all. Many 
The Reform of Guinea-Bissau’s Security Sector 25
 
 
representatives in the security sector are thus only marginally capable – at times even 
completely incapable – of effectively engaging in reforms. This does not, however, mean 
that their perceptive capacities should be denied, nor does it justify underestimating, 
ignoring or excluding them. They are, however, easier to manipulate than one would 
expect of those with more education. In contrast to the way things are currently 
progressing, a reform of the security sector in a politically unstable country with a low 
level of education like Guinea Bissau – whose actors in the security sector strongly pursue 
their own interests – must essentially be carried out with greater flexibility and a long-
term outlook. Local perspectives and interests must be considered to a far greater degree, 
fear of change must be overcome with empathy, and tangible utility must be made 
apparent to those impacted. 
Finally, a question emerges as to how suitable the Bissau-Guinean government and 
administration would be in serving as corrective instruments for undesirable 
developments, granted that the country is allowed to develop a reform strategy on its 
own. Regardless of capacity problems and the paternalistic predispositions of political 
representatives towards donors and civil society, research findings from developmental 
sociology and ethnology cast doubt on this prospect. Relevant literature from decades past 
has already described and analyzed the fixation of strategic groups (such as ministerial 
bureaucracies) on relatively easily accessible revenue that stems from development 
cooperation (see Evers/Schiel 1988: 228). Reform rhetoric directed at donors should 
attract projects and financing sources (see Hills 2012: 743); in this context, the role of 
economic considerations should not be underestimated. Particularly in a country like 
Guinea-Bissau that has been fixated and dependent on funds from development and 
financial cooperation since gaining independence, the issue of “extraversion” assumes 
crucial significance. Extraversion refers to a strategy by African societies to turn 
dependence into a resource: By targeting the mobilization of foreign resources, a steady 
flow of funds is ensured, along with continued dependence (Bayart 2012).  
One possibility for enhancing the prospects for success within security sector reform 
lies in actually facilitating self-determination, or rather reinforcing co-determination by 
local governmental institutions and civil society, along with strengthening the basic 
orientation of cooperation. Strengthening this basic orientation should be done through 
the involvement of lower and mid-level local security sector actors as well as focus groups 
from the populace. Bottom-up project approaches (in contrast to top-down approaches 
planned without incorporating local views from security actors and the local populace) 
have to precede any dominant, “holistic” macro-approaches in order to set the 
foundations for primarily structural security sector reforms in the first place (see Mannitz 
2014). Finally, improved coordination and communication is an indispensable 
prerequisite for optimizing reforms in the security sector. 
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